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Abstract
We solve a model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents that generates a
large equity premium, while simultaneously matching stock market participation and indi-
vidual asset holdings. The high risk premium is driven by incomplete risk sharing among
stockholders, which results from the combination of borrowing constraints and (realistically)
calibrated life-cycle earnings profiles, subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks.
We show that it is challenging to simultaneously match aggregate quantities (asset prices)
and individual quantities (asset allocations). Furthermore, limited participation has a neg-
ligible impact on the risk premium, contrary to the results of models where it is imposed
exogenously.
JEL Classification: E21, G11.
Key Words: Equity Premium, Preference Heterogeneity, Incomplete Risk Sharing, Life-
Cycle Models, Limited Stock Market Participation.
1 Introduction
We present an asset pricing model that closely matches aggregate asset pricing moments
(mean and standard deviation of stock returns and T-bill returns), while simultaneously
matching individual allocations (stock market participation rate and asset holdings). The
key ingredients of the model are household heterogeneity and market incompleteness.
Households are heterogeneous along several diﬀerent dimensions. First, they receive
diﬀerent uninsurable labor income shocks. Second we have a life-cycle model and therefore
young agents, mid-life households and retirees all behave diﬀerently. Third, we introduce a
fixed cost of stock market participation, and thus agents who have paid the cost have access
to a larger investment opportunity set. Fourth, households have Epstein-Zin preferences
(Epstein and Zin (1989)) and we consider heterogeneity in both risk aversion and elasticity
of intertemporal substitution.
Market incompleteness results from both aggregate and (uninsurable) idiosyncratic shocks,
combined with borrowing constraints. Aggregate uncertainty and the household preference
parameters are calibrated to match the second moments of equity returns and (stockholders’)
consumption growth. The idiosyncratic uncertainty is driven by a (realistically) calibrated
life-cycle stochastic earnings profile that agents cannot fully insure, and against which they
cannot borrow. In this context, our baseline model yields a high risk premium (4.33%)
and a low riskless rate (1.72%) with coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion no larger than 5.
The volatility of consumption growth, for both stockholders and non-stockholders, is also
consistent with the data.
Previous literature (e.g. Saito (1995), Basak and Cuoco (1998), or Guvenen (2003)) has
argued that (exogenous) limited stock market participation can help to explain the equity
risk premium puzzle.1 In our model limited participation is derived endogenously and,
consistent with the data, the non-participants are significantly less wealthy than households
that own stocks.2 Therefore, excluding those households from the equity market has a
1The models in Heaton and Lucas (2000) and Polkovnichenko (2004) also have exogenous participation
constraints, but obtain a smaller impact on the equity premium.
2According to the latest numbers from the Survey of Consumer Finances, the participation rate is 88.84%
among households with wealth above the median, and only 15.21% for those with wealth below the median.
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negligible impact on the risk premium. Only by assuming extremely high entry costs, or
by imposing the participation constraint exogenously, would it be possible to exclude rich
households and thus produce a significant increase in the risk premium.3
We rationalize the modest participation rates observed in the data (Mankiw and Zeldes
(1991)) by introducing a small stock market entry cost. Households with very low risk
aversion (RA) and low elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) do not particularly
care about hedging background risk (because of the low RA) or about saving for retirement
(because of the low EIS). Therefore, they behave essentially as in the Deaton (1991) infinite
horizon model. They smooth earnings shocks with a small buﬀer stock of assets, and most
of them never invest in equities. Investors with high risk aversion and high EIS, on the
other hand, participate in the stock market from early on. They accumulate more wealth
and have a stronger incentive to pay the fixed cost. It is important to point out that, this
self-selection of more risk-averse investors as stockholders, is not driving our equity premium
results. As previously mentioned, the equity premium remains essentially unchanged when
we eliminate the participation constraints and all households invest in equities.
Asset-pricing models usually assume that equity exists in positive net supply, while the
riskless asset exists in zero net supply.4 We instead explicitly include government bonds that
exist in positive net supply. In equilibrium, the zero-net-supply assumption implies that the
representative consumer must invest all of her wealth in the risky asset. Furthermore, in
models with limited stock market participation, this implies that a significant fraction of the
population must hold levered positions in equities. Those predictions are in clear contrast
with the empirical evidence on household-level asset holdings (see, for instance, Poterba and
Samwick (2001), Ameriks and Zeldes (2001), or Guiso, Haliassos and Japelli (2002)).
Matching the participation rate and asset allocation decisions implies more than an in-
crease in the complexity of the model. We quantify an important trade-oﬀ between con-
sistency with asset pricing moments, and consistency with household portfolios and the
The median wealth for stockholders is $154, 600, while the median wealth for non-stockholders is $7, 300.
3In Cao, Wang and Zhang (forthcoming) limited participation can arise endogenously in a single-period
mean-variance equilibrium due to the presence of model uncertainty and heterogeneity in uncertainty aver-
sion. In their model, limited participation can actually decrease the equity premium.
4Alternatively the riskless rate is specified exogenously and the supply of bonds is perfectly elastic.
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participation rate. If the riskless asset exists in positive supply, households require a higher
riskless rate to induce them to hold bonds. In addition, their consumption volatility falls as
a smaller fraction of their wealth is now invested in the risky security. These two eﬀects lead
to a lower equity premium. In fact, as we decrease the supply of the riskless asset towards
zero, our model can easily match the historical equity premium with a low riskless rate and
low consumption volatility. Furthermore, if we do not care about matching the participation
rate and the wealth distribution, then we can have a model without preference heterogene-
ity. Such a model matches aggregate moments (asset prices and consumption volatility)
quite well, and replicates the unconditional results in Storesletten et al. (2001), or in the
representative agent framework of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), among others.
Our paper is part of a large literature investigating the implications of heterogeneous
agent models with incomplete markets and/or limited stock market participation for asset
pricing.5 We also build on the literature on asset allocation with undiversifiable labor income
risk.6 The closest papers to ours are Saito (1995), Basak and Cuoco (1998), Heaton and
Lucas (2000), Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2001) and Guvenen (2003). Storesletten
et al. (2001) also have a life-cycle model, but do not have participation costs, preference
heterogeneity or retirement income (social security system). We use the first two features to
match the stock market participation rate, and the third to obtain a more accurate measure of
households’ earnings uncertainty. Heaton and Lucas (2000) solve an overlapping generations
exchange economy where households live for two periods. They model (exogenous) limited
5For instance, Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Telmer (1993), Allen and Gale (1994), den Haan (1994),
Lucas (1994), He and Modest (1995), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Krusell and Smith (1997), Basak and Cuoco
(1998), Luttmer (1999), Heaton and Lucas (2000), Abel (2001), Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2001),
Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (2002), Calvet, Gonzalez-Eiras, and Sodini (2002), and Guvenen
(2003). See also the empirical work by Brav, Constantinides and Geczy (2002), Attanasio, Banks and
Tanner (2002), and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002b).
6See, for instance, Heaton and Lucas (1997), Bertaut and Haliassos (1997), Koo (1998), Cocco, Gomes and
Maenhout (1999), Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2001), Campbell, Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2001), Vi-
ceira (2001), Hu (2001), Davis, Kubler and Willen (2002), Polkovnichenko (2002), Haliassos and Michaelides
(2003), Cocco (forthcoming), Yao and Zhang (forthcoming), Gomes and Michaelides (2003 and forthcoming),
and Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2004).
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participation and incomplete risk sharing. Guvenen (2003), Basak and Cuoco (1998) and
Saito (1995) also match the stock market participation rates. Relative to these models,
we endogeneize the participation decision. Moreover, we do not have perfect risk sharing
among stockholders. These diﬀerences are crucial since our risk premium is driven by the
imperfect risk sharing across shareholders, and is almost unaﬀected by limited participation.
In addition, we have a life-cycle model with a calibrated earnings process and retirement
income, thus closely matching the level of earnings uncertainty in the data. Finally, unlike
all these papers, we explicitly take into account government debt, which has important asset
pricing implications.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and calibration while
Section 3 discusses the baseline results. Section 4 studies the determinants of the equity
premium, while Section 5 oﬀers additional comparative statics. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Outline
The model is solved at an annual frequency. Households have a finite horizon divided into two
main phases: working life and retirement. During working life they receive a wage income
against which they cannot borrow, and subject to uninsurable shocks. At retirement they
receive a pension that is financed by taxes on current workers’ wages. Households can invest
in two alternative assets: a claim to the risky capital stock (equity) and a riskless government
bond. Before investing in equity for the first time they must pay a fixed participation cost.
Firms are perfectly competitive, and combine capital and labor, using a constant returns
to scale technology, to produce a non-durable consumption good. The government taxes
wages to finance the social security scheme (pension income), while taxes on both capital
gains and bequests are used to finance government expenditures and the interest payments
on public debt.
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2.2 Production technology
2.2.1 Production function
The technology in the economy is characterized by a standard Cobb-Douglas production
function, with total output at time t given by
Yt = ZtKαt L
1−α
t (1)
where K is the total capital stock in the economy, L is the total labor supply and Z is a
stochastic productivity shock which follows the process
Zt = GtUt (2)
Gt = (1 + g)t (3)
Secular growth in the economy is determined by the constant g (>0), while the productivity
shocks Ut follow a two-state Markov chain capturing the average business cycle duration.
Firms make decisions after observing aggregate shocks. Therefore, they solve a sequence
of static maximization problems with no uncertainty, and factor prices (wages, Wt, and
return on capital, RKt ) are given by the firm’s first-order conditions
Wt = (1− α)Zt(Kt/Lt)α (4)
and
RKt = αZt(Lt/Kt)
1−α − δt (5)
where δt is the depreciation rate.
2.2.2 Stochastic depreciation
Standard frictionless production economies cannot generate suﬃcient return volatility, since
agents can adjust their investment plans to smooth consumption over time (see Jermann
(1998) or Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001)). This usually motivates adjustment costs
for capital, which create fluctuations in the price of capital and increase return volatility (see
also Cochrane (1991)).7
7Adjustment costs are also very important for a realistic characterization of aggregate investment flows.
See, for example, Abel and Eberly (1994) or Eberly (1997).
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Since we have incomplete markets, diﬀerent stockholders have diﬀerent stochastic dis-
count factors. They will therefore disagree on the solution to the optimal intertemporal
decision problem of the firm (see Grossman and Hart (1979)). This is not a concern here
because there is no intertemporal dimension to the firm’s problem, but introducing adjust-
ment costs would change that.8 Recent papers with production economies and incomplete
markets have captured the adjustment cost eﬀect by assuming a stochastic depreciation rate
for capital (Storesletten et al. (2001), Krueger and Kubler (2004), and Gottardi and Kubler
(2004)). We follow the same route and assume that the depreciation rate is given by
δt = δ + s ∗ ηt (6)
where ηt is an i.i.d. standard normal and s is a scalar. Therefore, δt is a general measure of
economic depreciation, combining physical depreciation, adjustment costs, capital utilization
and investment-specific productivity shocks.9
In the baseline case we assume that ηt is uncorrelated with the productivity shock Ut. A
positive correlation might be more intuitive, reflecting higher capital utilization in booms,
and therefore we will also consider this case.
2.3 The government sector and social security
A social security system is important to provide the model with a realistic labor income
process. If we were to ignore social security transfers we would significantly increase house-
holds’ income risk and wealth accumulation. The government sector is crucial to model
government bonds in positive supply, so as to match the average portfolio allocations in the
data.
8Guvenen (2003) introduces adjustment costs in a model with restricted stock market participation, but
in his model the participation constraint is exogenous and there is perfect risk sharing among stockholders.
Therefore, there is a unique stochastic discount factor for pricing capital.
9Hercowitz (1986) and Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huﬀman (1988) use the same approach to model
fluctuations in capital utilization, while Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) use it to model investment-
specific technological shocks as a reduced form for vintage capital models.
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2.3.1 The social security system
The social security budget is balanced in all periods so we can discuss it separately. Given
a value for the replacement ratio of working life earnings (denoted by λ), a proportional
social security tax rate on labor income (denoted by τ s) is determined endogenously. This
tax rate ensures that the social security taxes are equal to total retirement benefits, taking
into account the demographic weights and survival probabilities.
2.3.2 The government sector
The government’s budget constraint (excluding social security) is
GCt +R
B
t Bt = Bt+1 −Bt + Tt (7)
where GC is government consumption, B is public debt, RB is the interest rate on govern-
ment bonds, and T denotes the tax revenues. Tax proceeds arise from proportional taxation
on capital (tax rate τK) and a 100% tax rate on bequests (E). The steady-state level of
government debt (as a fraction of GDP) is calibrated to the data. Government consumption
is determined as the residual from (7), given the (exogenous) level of debt, the (exogenous)
tax rate on capital, and the (endogenous) interest rate on bonds. These expenditures do not
enter the agents’ utility function.
2.4 Households and financial markets
2.4.1 Preferences
Time is discrete. We follow the convention in life-cycle models and let adult age (a) cor-
respond to eﬀective age minus 19. Each period corresponds to one year and agents live
for a maximum of 81 (A) periods (age 100). The probability that a consumer is alive at
age (a + 1), conditional on being alive at age a, is denoted by pa (p0 = 1). Households
have Epstein-Zin preferences (Epstein and Zin (1989)) defined over a single non-durable
consumption good. Let Ca and Xa denote consumption and wealth (cash-on-hand) at age
9
a, respectively. Household preferences are defined by
Va =
½
(1− βpa)C1−1/ψa + βpa
¡
Ea(V
1−ρ
a+1 )
¢ 1−1/ψ
1−ρ
¾ 1
1−1/ψ
(8)
where ρ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, ψ is the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution and β is the discount factor.
2.4.2 Labor endowment
Before retirement all households supply labor inelastically. The stochastic process for indi-
vidual labor income (Hiat) is given by
10 ,11
Hiat =WtL
i
a (9)
where Lia is the household’s labor endowment (labor supply scaled by productivity) and
Wt is the aggregate wage per unit of productivity. The household’s labor endowment is
specified to match the standard stochastic earnings profile in life-cycle models of savings and
portfolio choice. More precisely, labor income productivity combines both permanent (P ia)
and transitory (εi) shocks with a deterministic age-specific profile:
Lia = P
i
aε
i (10)
P ia = exp(f(a))P
i
a−1ξ
i (11)
where f(a) is a deterministic function of age, capturing the typical hump-shape profile in
life-cycle earnings. We assume that ln εi, and ln ξi are each independent and identically
distributed with mean {−.5 ∗ σ2ε , −.5 ∗ σ2ξ}, and variances σ2ε and σ2ξ, respectively.
Retirement is exogenous and deterministic. All households retire at age 65 (aR = 46)
and retirement earnings are given by: λP iaRWt, where λ is the replacement ratio.
10We now include a superscript i to identify household specific variables.
11Lettau (2003) shows that allowing for a labor leisure choice does not meaningfully aﬀect the asset pricing
implications of production based models.
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2.4.3 Financial markets
There are two financial assets: a one-period riskless asset (government bonds), and a risky
investment opportunity (capital stock). The riskless asset return is RBt =
1
PBt−1
−1, where PB
denotes the government-bond price. The return on the risky asset is denoted by RKt . Before
investing in stocks for the first time the investor must pay a fixed lump sum cost equal
to FP iaWt. This represents both the explicit transaction cost from opening a brokerage
account and the (opportunity) cost of acquiring information about the stock market. The
fixed cost (F ) is scaled by permanent labor income (P ia) and by the aggregate wage (Wt).
This significantly simplifies the model’s solution and is consistent with the opportunity cost
interpretation.
2.4.4 Wealth accumulation
Total liquid wealth (cash-on-hand) can be consumed or invested in the two assets. At
each age (a), agents enter the period with wealth invested in the bond market, Bia, and
(potentially) in stocks, Sia, and receive L
i
aWt as labor income. Let the dummy variable I
i
P
denote the time in which the participation cost is paid. Cash-on-hand at time t is given by
X ia = K
i
a(1 + (1− τK)RKt ) +Bia(1 + (1− τK)RBt ) + Lia(1− τ s)Wt − I iPFP iaWt (12)
before retirement (a < aR), and by
Xia = K
i
a(1 + (1− τK)RKt ) +Bia(1 + (1− τK)RBt ) + λP iaRWt − IiPFP iaKWt (13)
during retirement (a > aR).
Households cannot borrow against their future labor income, and cannot short any asset.
More precisely,
Bia ≥ 0 (14)
Kia ≥ 0 (15)
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2.5 The individual optimization problem
2.5.1 Household expectations
Households are price takers and maximize utility given their expectations about future asset
returns and aggregate wages. Under rational expectations, the latter are given by equations
(4) and (5): future returns and wages are determined by future capital and labor, and by the
realizations of aggregate shocks. Labor supply is exogenous as are the distributions of the
aggregate shocks. The capital stock, however, is endogenous. Forming rational expectations
of future returns and wages is, therefore, essentially equivalent to forecasting the future
capital stock.
Capital accumulation is determined by the cross-sectional asset wealth distribution. We
would therefore need to include this as a state-variable in the household’s optimization
problem. Krusell and Smith (1998) and den Haan (1997) suggest that, for this class of
incomplete-markets economies, it is possible to approximate this infinite-dimensional state
variable with a small set of moments. As discussed in the appendix, our model can ac-
curately approximate the information contained in this distribution using its lagged mean
(last-period’s aggregate capital stock, Kt−1) and the state-contingent realizations of the two
aggregate shocks (productivity shock, Ut , and stochastic depreciation, ηt):
Kt = ΓK(Kt−1, Ut, ηt) (16)
Since government bonds are only riskless over one period, households must forecast future
bond prices (PBt ). The forecasting rule for P
B
t is
PBt = ΓP (P
B
t−1, Kt−1, Ut, ηt) (17)
This introduces four additional state variables in the individual’s maximization problem
(PBt−1, Kt−1, Ut, and ηt).
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2.5.2 The dynamic programming problem
We can now write the individual’s recursive optimization problem. We normalize all indi-
vidual variables by the household’s permanent income (P iaG
1
1−α
t ) and all aggregate variables
(wage and capital) by aggregate permanent income (G
1
1−α
t ). This induces stationarity in
the model and reduces the dimensionality of the state vector by one variable. Normalized
variables are denoted by lower case letters (i.e., xiat ≡
Xia
P iaG
1
1−α
t
, kt ≡ Kt
G
1
1−α
t
, and wt ≡ Wt
G
1
1−α
t
).
The value function is denoted by Va(xiat, F
i
a; kt, Ut, ηt, P
B
t ), where a is age, x
i
at is individ-
ual normalized cash on hand, F ia denotes the stock market participation status (a zero-one
variable indicating whether the fixed cost has been paid or not), and the other four inputs
are the aggregate variables from the forecasting equations ((16) and (17)). The individual
optimization problem now becomes:
Va(xiat, F
i
a; kt, Ut, ηt, P
B
t )
= Max
{kia+1,bia+1}Aa=1
{(1− βpa)(ciat)1−1/ψ (18)
+βpa(Et[(
P ia+1
P ia
(1 + g)
1
1−α )1−ρV 1−ρa+1 (x
i
a+1,t+1, F
i
a+1; kt+1, Ut+1, ηt+1, P
B
t+1)])
1−1/ψ
1−ρ } 11−1/ψ
subject to the constraints,
kia+1 ≥ 0 (19)
bia+1 ≥ 0 (20)
cia + b
i
a+1 + k
i
a+1 = x
i
a (21)
and with the laws of motion,
xia+1,t+1 =
£
kia+1(1 + (1− τK)RKt+1) + bia+1(1 + (1− τK)RBt+1)
¤
[(P ia+1/P ia)(1 + g)
1
1−α ]
+ εi(1− τ s)wt+1 − I iPFwt+1
(22)
RKt+1 = R(kt+1, Ut+1) (23)
wt+1 =W (kt+1, Ut+1) (24)
kt+1 = ΓK(kt, Ut+1, ηt+1) (25)
PBt+1 = ΓP (kt, Ut+1, ηt+1, P
B
t ) (26)
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2.6 Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of endogenously determined prices (bond prices, wages, and equity
returns), a set of cohort specific value functions, and policy functions, {Va, ba, ka}Aa=1, and
rational expectations about the evolution of the endogenously determined variables, such
that:
1. Firms maximize profits by equating marginal products of capital and labor to their
respective marginal costs: equations (4) and (5).
2. Individuals choose their optimal consumption and asset allocation by solving (18).
3. Markets clear and aggregate quantities result from individual decisions. Specifically,
kt =
Z
i
Z
a
P iak
i
atdadi (27)
bt =
Z
i
Z
a
P iab
i
atdadi (28)
The aggregation equation for labor supply is redundant since there is no labor-leisure choice.
Once these two equations are satisfied, Walras’ law implies that total expenditure (govern-
ment consumption, investment and household consumption) must equal total output:
GCt
G
1
1−α
t
+ G
1
1−α
t kt+1 − (1− δt)kt +
Z
i
Z
a
P iac
i
atdadi = Utk
α
t L
1−α
t (29)
4. Accidental bequests (E) are taxed at a 100% rate, and are given by:
Et = G
1
1−α
t
Z
i
Z
a
(1− pa)P iaxiatdadi (30)
5. The social security system is balanced at all times,Z
i
Z
a∈IW
τ sL
i
awtdadi =
Z
i
Z
a∈IR
[λ exp(f(aR))wtP
i
aR ]dadi (31)
where the left hand side is integrated over all workers (a ∈ IW ), while the right hand side
over retirees (a ∈ IR). We choose λ exogenously, thereby endogenously determining the
value of τ s that keeps the social security system balanced in each period.
6. The government budget (equation (7)) is balanced every period to sustain a given
ratio of government debt to GDP (bt/yt).
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7. Expectations about the future evolution of market prices (which depend on the wealth
distribution) are verified in equilibrium.
Analytical solutions to this problem do not exist and we therefore use a numerical solution
method (details are given in the appendix).
2.7 Calibration
2.7.1 Aggregate variables
Decisions are made at an annual frequency. The productivity shock follows a first-order
Markov process with two values, {U b, Ug}, where Ug > U b. The probability of remaining in
the current state (π) is 2/3, yielding an average business cycle duration of six years. The
standard deviation of the aggregate productivity shock (σU) is set to 1%. Given all other
parameter values, we set this volatility to match the standard deviation of aggregate output
in the data.
Capital’s share of output (α) is set to 36%, and the average annual depreciation rate (δ)
is 10%. The parameter s that determines the return volatility is set at 16%. We discuss
the calibration of s (and σU) in much more detail below. The aggregate supply of bonds is
set equal to 40% of GDP. The total value of U.S. government debt is actually higher, but a
significant fraction is held by foreign institutions (or foreign governments). Our calibration
is based on the average value of U.S. Treasury securities held by the U.S. public which is 35%
of GDP, according to numbers from the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (from 1962 to 2003).
We use 40% to take into account for additional indirect holdings (e.g. by corporations),
which we cannot measure. The capital tax rate is 20%, while bequests are taxed at 100%.12
2.7.2 Household variables
Agents begin working life at age 20, retire at age 65, and can live up to 100 years. We use the
mortality tables of the National Center for Health Statistics to parameterize the conditional
survival probabilities. The idiosyncratic shocks’ variances are taken from Carroll (1992):
10 percent per year for σε and 8 percent per year for σξ. The deterministic labor income
12Total bequest are quite small and this assumption is only made for simplicity.
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profile reflects the hump shape of earnings over the life-cycle. The corresponding parameter
values, just like the retirement transfers (λ = (1 − τ s)0.68), are taken from Cocco, Gomes
and Maenhout (1999). From equation (31) this generates an endogenous social security tax
(τ s) of approximately 10%.
We consider two cases for the fixed cost of participation: one where the cost is zero and
another corresponding to 5% of the household’s expected annual income. For the average
household with an annual labor income of $35, 000, this corresponds to $1, 750. Paiella
(2001) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002b) have used Euler equation estimation methods to obtain
implied participation costs from observed consumption choices. They find values in the $75
to $200 range, but these are per-period costs. Our number is therefore comparable in a
present-value terms. Nevertheless, we show that we can also match the data with lower
values of F (e.g. 2.5%).
We consider two groups of agents with the same population size and diﬀerent preference
parameters. In the baseline version of the model, type-A has low risk aversion (ρA = 1.5)
and low elasticity of intertemporal substitution (ψA = 1/6), while type-B has higher risk
aversion (ρB = 5) and slightly higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution (ψB = 0.4). The
discount factor (β) is equal to 0.99 for both groups, corresponding to an average discount
rate of 2.8% once adjusted for the survival probabilities.
3 Baseline Results
3.1 Individual allocations
3.1.1 Consumption and savings
Figure 1 plots the life-cycle profiles of consumption, wealth and labor income for the aver-
age household. From age 65 onwards labor income refers to retirement income. Early in
life, households accumulate a small buﬀer-stock of wealth. Later on they start saving for
retirement. From about age 50 onwards consumption exceeds labor income, the diﬀerence
being financed by the previously accumulated financial wealth. The combination of idiosyn-
cratic shocks and preference heterogeneity induces significant cross-sectional heterogeneity
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in wealth accumulation. This is highlighted in Table 1 where we report the diﬀerent quar-
tiles of the wealth-to-income ratio distribution from the baseline model. For comparison, we
include the same numbers from the 2001 SCF. The model’s values are consistent with those
in the data. In particular the model matches well the right tail of the wealth distribution.13
Early in life households face liquidity constraints and therefore they save only for pre-
cautionary reasons, i.e. to insure themselves against earnings shocks. As a result, at this
life-cycle stage, savings are mostly determined by prudence/risk aversion (ρ). The less risk-
averse households accumulate less wealth since they are less concerned about background
risk. At mid-life, the savings behavior is determined mostly by the preference for low-
frequency consumption smoothing, i.e. by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS,
ψ). As a result, at this life-cycle stage households with lower EIS save less. Combining these
two results, we conclude that type-A households (with low RA and low EIS) accumulate
significantly less wealth over the life-cycle. On the contrary, the type-B households (more
risk-averse and with higher EIS) constitute the majority of the wealthy population.
3.1.2 Participation rates
Decreasing risk aversion increases the optimal share invested in stocks but, (as shown in
the previous subsection) also decreases wealth accumulation at every life-cycle stage. The
impact of a change in risk aversion on the participation decision will therefore depend on
which of these two eﬀects dominates. Consistent with life-cycle asset allocation models (e.g.
Gomes and Michaelides (forthcoming)) we find that the wealth eﬀect dominates. The stock
market participation rate is much lower for the less-risk averse (type-A) households: 8.47%
versus 96.22% (see Table 2). Overall, the participation rate in the model is very close to the
one in the data: 52.35% versus 51.94%, respectively.
It is important to mention that our results do not depend on the fact that non-stockholders
tend to have lower risk-aversion and/or lower EIS. As we discuss below, the preference
parameters of the stock market non-participants are irrelevant for determining equilibrium
asset pricing moments. What is crucial is that stock market non-participants are less wealthy
13We note however that, for higher percentiles (e.g. 90th or 95th), the values in the data are almost twice
as high as those implied by the model.
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than the stock market participants. In the context of a life-cycle model with uninsurable
labor income and retirement savings this implies some combination of lower risk aversion,
lower EIS and lower discount rate. Naturally not all of these are simultaneously required.
Here we choose the first two (lower risk aversion and lower EIS) and kept the discount
rate identical, but we could have kept the EIS or risk aversion identical instead. All these
alternative models would be observationally equivalent for our purposes.
3.2 Asset prices and consumption volatility
The model is calibrated to match the equity return volatility using the standard deviation
of the stochastic depreciation (s). We use the EIS of the type-B agents (ψB), and the
discount factor (β, which is identical for both types) to match three key moments: the level
and volatility of the riskless rate, and the consumption growth volatility (discussed below).
We choose the preference parameters of the type-A agents (EIS and RA) to match the
participation rate, which has almost no impact on asset pricing moments, as discussed in
more detail in the next sections. This leaves one free parameter to match the risk premium:
the type-B agents’ risk aversion.14
3.2.1 Asset returns
Table 3 reports the main asset pricing moments implied by the model, along with their
empirical U.S. counterparts taken from Campbell (1999). The mean risk-free rate and the
volatility of equity returns are closely matched.15 The standard deviation of the risk-free
rate is 3.07% compared with 5.33% in the data.16 This result is particularly good since,
in an economy with a non-trivial production sector, obtaining a low standard deviation of
14Since we have a model with incomplete markets this calibration is more complicated. For example,
risk aversion also aﬀects the risk-free rate, and the EIS also aﬀects the risk premium. We discuss these
relationships in more detail below.
15We could easily increase the volatility of equity returns to match the data exactly, by increasing s.
Naturally the corresponding equity premium would be even higher with this alternative calibration. However,
this would also lead to a higher volatility of both consumption growth and riskless rate.
16We undershot the risk-free rate volatility since we do not have inflation in the model.
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the riskless asset is quite challenging. Boldrin et al. (2001) report standard deviations
between 17.4% and 25.4%, while Guvenen (2003) and Jermann (1998) obtain 5.7% and
11.5%, respectively. With a risk aversion coeﬃcient of 5 for the type-B agents, the implied
equity premium is 4.33%, corresponding to approximately 70% of the risk premium in the
data. The serial correlation of equity returns is essentially zero as in the data, while the
risk-free rate in the model is more persistent than its empirical counterpart.
3.2.2 Consumption volatility
In an equilibrium with limited participation, equity is priced by the stochastic discount fac-
tors of stockholders. Therefore, it is important to check that the consumption risk implied
by the model is consistent with the data. Table 4 presents the standard deviation of con-
sumption growth for both stockholders and non-stockholders. We compare these with the
estimates in Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a), based on data from the Consumer Expenditure Sur-
vey (CES).17 Since consumption volatility in the CES slightly exceeds the volatility obtained
from the NIPA numbers, we have calibrated the model to undershoot the estimates from
Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a). With this in mind, the values in the model are similar to the
ones in the data, with the volatility of consumption growth for stockholders being higher
than that for non-stockholders.
3.2.3 Correlation between labor income shocks and stock returns
In a frictionless one-sector production economy the marginal productivity of capital and
labor are both driven by the same productivity shock. The correlation between aggregate
wages and the return on capital is therefore very high. This might suggest that our equity
premium is driven by a counterfactually high correlation between household earnings shocks
and stock returns. This is not the case, however. Consistent with the empirical evidence
(e.g., Davis and Willen (2001)), the endogenous correlation between household-level labor
income shocks and stock returns is close to zero (0.96%). Two features of the model explain
17The numbers in Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a) are semi-annual. In table III we convert them to an annual
frequency by assuming i.i.d. consumption growth over six-month intervals (we multiply the six month
standard deviations of consumption growth by
√
2).
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this. First, stochastic depreciation shocks (ηt) reduce the correlation between stock returns
(RKt ) and aggregate wages (wt), just as adjustment costs of capital would. Second, for a
given correlation between wt and RKt , the idiosyncratic productivity shocks imply a much
lower correlation between stock returns (RKt ) and household-level income (H
i
t).
4 Decomposing the Equity Premium
In this section we explore the explanatory contribution to the equity premium of the four
main features of the model: endogenous limited participation, preference heterogeneity, in-
complete risk sharing among stockholders and positive bond supply.
4.1 Limited participation
4.1.1 Model without limited participation
We consider a version of the model with the stock market entry cost (F ) set to zero, keeping
all other parameter values unchanged. The results are shown in Table 5 and are almost
identical to those obtained for the baseline model. Most importantly, there is a very modest
reduction in the equity premium: 5 basis points.
This might seem surprising given the results obtained in Saito (1995), Basak and Cuoco
(1998), or Guvenen (2003). These papers argue that limited stock market participation can
contribute for explaining the equity risk premium puzzle. In those models, however, stock
market participation is exogenous, while we derive it endogenously.18 As a result, in our
model the non-participants are significantly less wealthy than the rest of the population. This
is consistent with the data. According to the latest numbers from the Survey of Consumer
Finances, the participation rate is 88.84% among households with wealth above the median,
and only 15.21% for those with wealth below the median. The median wealth for stockholders
18Heaton and Lucas (2000) and Polkovnichenko (2004) also have exogenous participation constraints, but
they do not exclude a significant fraction of wealthy households. Therefore, their results are closer to ours.
For example, in Heaton and Lucas (2000), changing the participation rate from 50% to 100% increases the
equity premium by between 13% to 40% (depending on the specific parameter calibration).
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is $154, 600, while the median wealth for non-stockholders is $7, 300. In our model, the ratio
of median stockholders’ wealth to median non-stockholders’ wealth is approximately 30.
Therefore, excluding these households from the equity market has a negligible impact on the
risk premium.
Only by assuming extremely high entry costs or by imposing the participation constraint
exogenously, would it be possible to exclude rich households, thus producing a significant
increase in the risk premium. More precisely, in Saito (1995), for parameter values that
generate an equity premium in excess of 3%, the shadow value of the fixed cost that would
keep households out of the stock market ranges from 22.5% to 54.1% of total wealth.19
4.1.2 Lower participation cost
We also consider a lower fixed cost value (F ). As expected from our previous discussion, we
can again match the participation decision if we re-calibrate the preference parameters of the
type-A agents. Moreover, this has almost no impact on the other aggregate variables. More
precisely, we can decrease the fixed cost from 5% to 2.5%, and still obtain a participation rate
of 51.24% by reducing ρA (the risk aversion of ‘non-stockholders’) to 1.2. All other variables
remain essentially unchanged, and even the consumption growth of non-stockholders is only
marginally aﬀected.
Matching the participation rate with a lower entry cost makes our previous conclusion
stronger: the stock market non-participants are now even less wealthy, and therefore ex-
cluding them from the stock market has a smaller impact on the equity premium. Only if
we consider that our previous fixed cost value (F = 5%) is too low, could we question the
conclusion that the participation constraint has almost no impact on asset prices.
19Since this cost is computed as a function of total wealth, the implied cost is even larger for the median-
wealth household, when expressed in terms of current income (as we do in our model).
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4.2 Preference heterogeneity
4.2.1 Baseline parameters
We now consider an economy with only one type of agent: type-B, and the fixed cost of
participation set to zero. All other parameter values remain the same as in the baseline case.
We consider type-B agents because we want to generate a meaningful high equity premium.
We ignore the participation cost since it has almost no impact on these investors’ behavior.
The results are shown in column two of Table 6. In column one we report the results for the
two agent model without the fixed cost, for comparison.20
In the single-agent economy the (average) risk aversion is higher. This implies more
wealth accumulation and a reduced average return on both assets. We find that the risk-free
rate falls by more than the equity return and therefore the risk premium increases. The
risk-free rate volatility decreases since the (average) EIS is also higher in the single-agent
economy.
We must make two diﬀerent comparisons for the standard deviation of consumption
growth. First, it is higher than in the baseline economy. This is expected since now we do not
have type−A agents. The higher average risk aversion and higher average EIS both induce
more wealth accumulation, and this increases the volatility of consumption growth. Second,
when compared with the type−B agents in the baseline model, consumption volatility has
fallen. The preference parameters are now held constant and the risk-free rate volatility has
decreased, allowing for better consumption smoothing.
4.2.2 Re-calibrated model
We re-calibrate the single agent economy to match the level of the riskless rate, while keeping
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion constant at 5. Since we have two “free” preference
parameters (EIS ,ψ, and discount rate, β) we could closely match the consumption volatility
and the level of the riskless rate, as before. However, in an economy without limited partic-
ipation it is not clear if total aggregate data or stockholders’ data should be used to match
the consumption volatility. We therefore match an intermediate value, by setting ψ = 0.35
20These are essentially the same as the baseline results, as shown above (see table 3).
22
and β = 0.97. The results are shown in column three of Table 6. The new economy shares
most of the features of the previous single-agent economy (column two), in particular, a
similar risk premium and a lower standard deviation of the risk-free rate.
Comparing these results with the ones obtained in the previous subsection we find that
the two models deliver very similar implications for the aggregate variables. This implies
that, if we do not care about matching participation rates, then we can simply use the model
from this section (i.e. with one agent type only). However, as previously shown, if we also
want to match participation, or generate a more realistic wealth distribution, then we must
consider our baseline model. The economy without preference heterogeneity would require
an extremely large fixed cost to deliver significant non-participation, and the implied wealth
distribution does not replicate the lower half of the population.
4.3 Incomplete risk sharing among stockholders
We have shown that the equity premium in our model is not driven by limited participation.
This contrasts with the results in Saito (1995), Basak and Cuoco (1998), or Guvenen (2003).
However, in those models there is perfect risk sharing among stockholders, while in ours
that is not the case. We have incomplete risk sharing because of the existence of aggregate
uncertainty, which by definition cannot be fully diversified, and because of the presence of
idiosyncratic shocks and liquidity constraints.
4.3.1 Results without stochastic depreciation
If we set both aggregate shocks equal to zero stocks and bonds become perfect substitutes.
Therefore we only set s equal to zero, and keep all other parameter values unchanged. The
results are shown in Table 7. The stock returns volatility is now close to zero, and the
volatility of consumption growth also falls substantially: it is now 1.75% for stockholders
and 0.81% for non-stockholders.21 Even though equity returns are almost riskless, the con-
sumption growth volatility of stockholders and non-stockholders is not the same. These
21We still have non-stockholders even though stocks are almost riskless. Some households never accumulate
enough wealth to justify the fixed cost payment, given the modest equity premium of 1.32%.
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groups still have diﬀerent ratios of financial wealth to labor income.
Despite the low volatility of returns (and consumption), we still obtain a 1.32% equity
premium. The presence of undiversifiable idiosyncratic risk generates a high ‘equilibrium
market price of risk’ thus delivering a non-trivial equity premium even for a smaller value
of aggregate uncertainty. Given this market price of risk, the level of aggregate uncertainty
essentially scales the risk premium up or down.22
It is interesting to report that, the correlation between labor income shocks and stock
returns is now much higher: 57% versus 1% in the baseline case. This was expected since
returns on capital are now driven exclusively by the aggregate productivity shock, just like
wages. However, it is interesting to note that this correlation is still significantly below 1,
and this is due to the presence of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
4.3.2 Calibration of aggregate uncertainty
In standard endowment economies, aggregate consumption must equal aggregate dividends.
Therefore, the consumption growth volatility is essentially an exogenous parameter that can
be calibrated directly. In models with a non-linear production technology this is no longer
the case. Based on our previous discussion we set the parameters s and σu to match the
aggregate risk in the economy. For example, in the economy with low aggregate uncertainty
(Table 7) the volatility of (stockholders’) consumption growth is only 1.8% as opposed to
5.8% in the data, and 6.2% in our baseline economy.
The distinction between s and σu is important. With σu alone (and s = 0) we could
match either the volatility of consumption (and output) or the stock return volatility, but
not both simultaneously. In such a set-up, matching consumption volatility would produce
a very low return volatility. On the other hand, matching the standard deviation of stock
returns would imply a high standard deviation of consumption growth.
22This is the same mechanism that would obtain in the presence of explicit adjustment costs (e.g. Jermann
(1998), Boldrin et al. (2001) or Guvenen (2003)) .
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4.3.3 Correlation between the two aggregate shocks
In the baseline case we have assumed that the two aggregate shocks (stochastic depreciation,
ηt and productivity, Ut) are independent. We now assume that they are positively correlated.
This reflects higher capital utilization in booms and is motivated by the interpretation of
δt as economic depreciation. As we increase this correlation we obtain the exact opposite
results as from a small increase in the type-B investors’ EIS (ψB).23 Therefore, the model
with positive correlation between these two shocks is almost observationally equivalent to a
model with independent shocks and a slightly lower value of ψB. For example, let κ denote
the probability of a high (low) ηt, conditional on a high (low) Ut. In the baseline model we
have κ = 0.5 and ψB = 0.4. The corresponding results are very similar to those obtained
with κ = 0.75 and ψB = 0.375.
4.4 Level of government debt
Asset pricing models usually assume that the riskless asset exists in zero net supply. This
implies that the representative consumer must invest all of her wealth in the risky asset.
In models with limited stock market participation, such as ours, this also implies that a
significant fraction of the population must hold levered positions in equities. These predic-
tions clearly contrast with the empirical evidence on household-level asset holdings (see, for
instance, Poterba and Samwick (2001), Ameriks and Zeldes (2001), or Guiso, Haliassos and
Japelli (2002)). We explicitly allow for government bonds in positive supply, and calibrate
the model to match the historical ratio of government debt to GDP. However, this makes
it harder to match the unconditional asset pricing moments. To show this, we decrease the
ratio of government debt to GDP from 40% to 15% and compare the results with those
obtained in the baseline economy.24
23Those results are discussed in the comparative statics section. The volatility of stock returns is almost
unaﬀected, the standard deviation of stockholder’s consumption growth and the equity premium increase,
while the mean and standard deviation of bond returns decrease.
24We do not consider a case with zero government debt because we still want to match the stock market
participation rates. Since agents that do not participate in the stock market must hold positive amounts
of bonds, the other agents would then be forced to hold negative amounts. Therefore, this would require
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We consider an economy with the same parameter values as in the baseline case. The
results are shown in column two of Table 8. Naturally, as we decrease the bond supply, the
bond price increases and the risk-free rate falls. Households are required to invest a larger
fraction of their wealth in stocks. This leads to a higher equity premium and to a significant
increase in the consumption growth volatility. More precisely, for the same parameter values
as the baseline case, the risk-free rate drops to −0.04% and the equity premium increases to
5.60%, while the standard deviation of consumption growth for stockholders is now 5.72%.
We now re-calibrate this version of the model to match the same asset pricing moments
as the baseline case: mean riskless rate, participation rate, riskless rate volatility, and con-
sumption growth volatility. Under the new calibration we decreased the discount factor (β)
to 0.98. The results are shown in column three of Table 8. With a consumption volatility (for
stockholders) of 5.23% and a riskless rate of 1.35%, the model generates an equity premium
of 5.23%. Therefore, as we converge to the standard assumption (zero bond net supply), the
equity premium in the model approaches the historical value.
5 Additional Comparative Statics
5.1 Preference parameters
Table 9 reports changes in key moments of the model from perturbing the main preference
parameters. There is no change in the standard deviation of equity returns (therefore not
reported) because stock market volatility is determined almost exclusively by stochastic
depreciation (s).
Decreasing ψB (the type−B investors’ EIS) or decreasing β (the discount factor) pro-
duces similar results. In both cases there is a reduction in wealth accumulation (K/Y falls)
implying an increase in the average returns of both assets. The supply of the riskless asset
is constant while the capital stock is endogenous. Market clearing therefore implies that the
risk-free rate increases by more than the return on capital. Hence, in equilibrium, the eq-
uity premium falls. The stockholders’ consumption growth volatility decreases slightly since
relaxing the short-selling constraints on equity, making it harder to compare across the two cases.
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there is a reduction in the ratio of financial wealth to labor income. Naturally, changing
the discount factor also significantly impacts the volatility of non-stockholders consumption
growth, since this parameter has the same value for both types.
As we decrease the type-B investors’ risk aversion (ρB), we have two eﬀects on returns.
First, total wealth accumulation falls leading to an increase in the average returns on both
assets. Second, these investors are now more willing to hold equity, which simultaneously
increases the risk-free rate and decreases the expected return on capital. These two eﬀects
lead to a clear increase in the risk-free rate. In addition, we should observe a larger decrease
in the equity premium than in the previous experiments (i.e. when decreasing ψB or β).
The impact on the capital stock and the expected equity return, however, is ambiguous. For
these parameter values, the capital output ratio decreases slightly thus increasing the equity
return. The standard deviation of stockholders’ consumption growth falls, again due to a
reduction in the ratio of financial wealth to labor income.25
Finally, the participation rate is almost unaﬀected in all cases. Stock market participation
is essentially determined by the fixed cost and the preference parameters of the type-A
investors.
5.2 Other parameters
In Table 10 we present comparative statics on the technology parameters. An increase in
σU is reflected in higher volatility of output (not reported) and consumption. As aggregate
uncertainty increases so does precautionary savings. Consequently, the capital-output ratio
increases and asset returns fall. Since bond supply is constant the riskless rate must adjust
more than the return on capital, leading to a modest increase in the equity premium. A
higher π (persistence of U) also increases aggregate uncertainty by increasing the persistence
of the transitory shocks. The qualitative results are, therefore, the same as the ones obtained
in the previous experiment (higher σU). Since these shocks are transitory the quantitative
25The standard deviation of non-stockholders consumption growth is also marginally aﬀected for two
reasons. First, there is the indirect impact on the type-A investors (most of whom are non-stockholders)
through the change on the level and volatility of the risk-free rate. Second, some of the type-B investors are
also non-stockholders.
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impact is small.
A lower depreciation rate (δ) makes equity relatively more attractive, causing the capital
stock to increase substantially. Mechanically, a 2% reduction in δ would lead to an equal
increase in the average return on capital. However, since the capital stock is also higher,
the equilibrium average equity return only increases by 0.76%. The risk-free rate also rises,
reflecting the change in the relative demand for the two assets.
6 Conclusion
We present an asset pricing model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents that
reproduces key aggregate moments, while being consistent with observed individual asset
allocation decisions. More precisely, the model matches the level and volatility of the risk-
free rate, the stock market participation rate and the micro-evidence on asset allocation
decisions. Further, the model explains approximately two thirds of the historical equity risk
premium.
Market incompleteness results from both aggregate and (uninsurable) idiosyncratic shocks.
The idiosyncratic uncertainty is driven by a (realistically) calibrated life-cycle income pro-
file that agents cannot fully insure, and against which they cannot borrow. This is a very
important feature of the model. If we want to closely replicate the level of risk that house-
holds actually face, then an infinite horizon model (without a retirement period among other
things) would fall short.
We then decompose each component’s contribution to the risk premium. We find that
limited stock market participation has a negligible impact, contrary to previous results in the
literature where the participation decision is specified exogenously. The risk premium in our
model is generated by incomplete risk sharing among stockholders. Furthermore, accounting
for government bonds in positive supply drives down the equity premium, making it harder
to match the historical numbers. If we relax this assumption, the model is able to match
the historical equity premium with a realistic consumption growth volatility.
One should be careful about interpreting our limited participation results. Namely, these
results do not imply that all changes in the participation rate will have (close to) zero impact
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on asset prices. In particular, a social security reform that changes households’ savings
incentives (or creates forced savings), will simultaneously increase the participation rate and
the wealth accumulation by (the previous) non-stockholders. Equilibrium returns could then
be significantly aﬀected. Our results do, however, imply that reductions in the transaction
costs associated with stock market participation (e.g. reduction in brokerage fees, expansion
of online discount brokers, etc.) will have almost no impact on the steady-state distribution
of asset returns.
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Appendix: Solving the model
1) Solution method outline
The solution method builds on den Haan (1994, 1997), Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998)
and Storesletten et al. (2001). We start by presenting the outer loop of the code and discuss
the details afterwards.
The numerical sequence works as follows:
i) Specify a set of forecasting equations (ΓK and ΓP ).
ii) Solve the household’s decision problem, taking prices as given, and using the forecast-
ing equations to form expectations (details in 2).
iii) Given the policy functions, simulate the model (5500 periods) while computing the
market clearing variables at each period (details in 3).
iv) Use the simulated time-series to update the forecasting equations (details in 4).
v) Repeat ii), iii) and iv) with the new forecasting equations until convergence. We have
two convergence criteria:
- Stable coeﬃcients in the forecasting equations.
- Forecasting equations with regression R2 above 99%.
2) Solving the household’s decision problem
2.1) Normalization
We first simplify the solution by exploiting the scale-independence of the maximization
problem and rewriting all individual variables as ratios to the permanent component of labor
income (P ia) and of the deterministic growth (G
1
1−α ). Likewise all aggregate variables (the
wage and capital) are normalized by G
1
1−α
t thus inducing stationarity in the model. Using
lower case letters to denote the normalized variables we have, for instance
xiat ≡
Xia
P iaG
1
1−α
t
(A1)
kt ≡
Kt
G
1
1−α
t
, wt ≡
Wt
G
1
1−α
t
(A2)
The equations of motion and the value function can then be rewritten as normalized variables,
allowing us to reduce the number of state variables. The normalized individual cash on hand
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state variable follows
xia+1,t+1 =
£
kia+1(1 + (1− τK)RKt+1) + bia+1(1 + (1− τK)RBt+1)
¤
[GR]
+ εi(1− τ s)wt+1 − I iPFwt+1
(A3)
where GR =
P ia+1
P ia
(1 + g)
1
1−α , and the value function becomes Va(xiat, F
i
a; kt, Ut, ηt, P
B
t ).
1. The rates of return on the factors of production can be written as
RKt = αZt(
Kt
Lt
)α−1 − δt = αZt(
ktG
1
1−α
t
Lt
)α−1 − δt = αUt(
kt
Lt
)α−1 − δt (A4)
and
Wt = (1− α)Zt(
kt
Lt
)α = (1− α)G
1
1−α
t Ut(
kt
Lt
)α (A5)
so that wt = (1− α)Ut( ktLt )
α.
2.2) Discretization of the state space
Age (a) is a discrete state variable taking 81 possible values. We discretize the cash-on-
hand dimension (xit) using 51 points, with denser grids closer to zero to take into account
the higher curvature of the value function in this region. With respect to the other two
continuous state variables, we use 16 points to discretize kt, and 25 points to discretize PBt .
The remaining state variables, depreciation shock (ηt), aggregate productivity shock (Ut) and
participation status (F it ) are all discrete, each taking only two possible values. Therefore no
approximation is required.26
The grid range for the continuous state variables is verified ex-post by comparing with
the values obtained in the simulations, and with the results obtained when this range is in-
creased. The number of grid points for xt is particularly important for producing an accurate
participation decision, since the policy functions for consumption and asset allocation would
not require this many points. A smaller number of grid points for kt and for PBt would not
aﬀect the policy functions directly. It would, however, aﬀect the R-squared of the forecasting
equations and the convergence of their respective coeﬃcients.
2.3) Maximization
26In the baseline version of the model this leads to a state space of dimension 13, 219, 200.
31
We solve the maximization problem for each agent type using backward induction. For
every age a prior to A, and for each point in the state space, we optimize using grid search.
We need to compute the value associated with each set of controls (consumption, decision
to pay the fixed cost, and share of wealth invested in stocks). From the Bellman equation,
Va(xiat, F
i
a; kt, Ut, ηt, P
B
t )
= Max
{kia+1,bia+1}Aa=1
{(1− βpa)(ciat)1−1/ψ (A6)
+βpa(Et[(
P ia+1
P ia
(1 + g)
1
1−α )1−ρV 1−ρa+1 (x
i
a+1,t+1, F
i
a+1; kt+1, Ut+1, ηt+1, P
B
t+1)])
1−1/ψ
1−ρ } 11−1/ψ
these values are given as a weighted sum of current utility ((ciat)
1−1/ψ) and the expected
continuation value (EaVa+1(.)), which we can compute once we have obtained Va+1. In the
last period, regardless of whether the fixed cost has already been paid, the policy functions
are trivial and the value function corresponds to the indirect utility function. This gives
us the terminal condition for our backward induction procedure. Once we have computed
the value of all the alternatives we pick the maximum, thus obtaining the policy rules for
the current period. Substituting these decision rules in the Bellman equation we obtain this
period’s value function (Va(.)), which is then used to solve the previous period’s maximization
problem. This process is iterated until a = 1.
We use the forecasting equations (ΓK and ΓP ) to form expectations of the aggregate
variables, and we perform all numerical integrations using Gaussian quadrature to approx-
imate the distributions of the innovations to the labor income process (εi and ξi) and the
aggregate shocks (ηt and Ut). For points which do not lie on state space grid, we evaluate the
value function using a cubic spline interpolation along the cash-on-hand dimension, and a
bi-linear interpolation along the other two continuous state variables (kt and PBt ). Bi-linear
interpolation works well along these two dimensions because households are price takers, and
therefore these state variables are not aﬀected by the control variables.
3) Simulating the model and clearing markets
3.1) Simulation
We use the policy functions for the two agent types (A and B) to simulate the behavior
of 2000 agents of each type in each of the 81 cohorts (total of 324, 000 households) over 5500
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periods. The realizations of the aggregate random variables (stochastic depreciation ηt and
aggregate productivity Ut) are drawn from their original two-point distributions, while the
idiosyncratic productivity shocks (εi and ξi) are drawn from the corresponding log-normal
distributions. All other random variables are endogenous to the model. The realizations of
the exogenous random variables are held constant within the outer loop, i.e. across iterations,
so as not to aﬀect the convergence criteria.
3.2) Market clearing
For every time period we simulate the households’ behavior for every possible bond price
(i.e. every point in the grid for PBt ). We then aggregate the individual bond demands
and use a linear interpolation to determine the market clearing bond price. All household
equilibrium allocations (consumption and asset holdings) are then obtained from a linear
interpolation with the same coeﬃcients, while the aggregate variables (capital and output)
are computed by aggregating these market clearing allocations. This then determines the
state variables for simulating the next period’s decisions.
4) Updating the forecasting equations:
Using the simulated time-series (after discarding the first 500 observations) we estimate
the following OLS regressions, for every pair of productivity shock (Ut+1) and depreciation
shock (ηt+1) realizations,
ln(kt+1) = q10 + q11 ln(kt) (A7)
and
ln(PBt+1) = q20 + q21 ln(kt) + q22 ln(P
B
t ) + q23(ln(P
B
t ))
2 (A8)
This gives us 8 equations and 8 sets of coeﬃcients that forecast state-contingent capital
(kt+1) and bond price (PBt+1). We iterate the code until we have converged on the coeﬃcients
and on the R-squared of these regressions. For the first set of equations (A7) we obtain R-
squared values around 99.99%. For the second set of equations (A8), the R-squared values are
in the 90%− 95% range when we only use ln(kt) as a regressor, increase to about 99% when
we add ln(PBt ), and are all above this threshold once we add the squared term: (ln(P
B
t ))
2.
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Table 1: Moments from the wealth-to-income ratio distribution.
The table reports values from the baseline model and the data (2001 Survey of Consumer
Finances). Income is defined as the sum of wages and salaries, unemployment or worker’s
compensation and pensions, annuities, or other disability or retirement programs. Wealth is
defined as liquid assets plus home equity. Liquid wealth is made up of all types of transaction
accounts, certificates of deposit, total directly-held mutual funds, stocks, bonds, total quasi-
liquid financial assets, savings bonds, the cash value of whole life insurance, other managed
assets (trusts, annuities and managed investment accounts) and other financial assets. Home
equity is defined as the value of the home less the amount still owed on the first and 2nd/3rd
mortgages and the amount owed on home equity lines of credit.
Model Data
25th percentile 1.09 0.33
Median 2.87 1.75
75th percentile 5.42 5.25
Table 2: Stock market participation rates (P ).
The second row reports data from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances; the third row
reports the unconditional results from baseline model; the fourth and fifth rows report the
average participation rates for each type of agent. Type-A agents have risk aversion equal
to 1.5, and elasticity of intermporal substitution equal to 1/6, and type-B agents have risk
aversion equal to 5 and elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to 0.4.
P
Data 51.94%
Model (average) 52.35%
Model (Type-A) 8.47%
Model (Type-B) 96.22%
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Table 3: Asset pricing moments from the data (Campbell (1999)) and from the baseline
model.
Variable Moment Model Data
Risk-free Rate Mean 1.72% 1.58%
Std. Dev. 3.07% 5.33%
AR(1) 0.88 0.52
Equity Return Mean 6.05% 8.31%
Std. Dev. 16.31% 19.81%
AR(1) −0.05 −0.06
Risk Premium Mean 4.33% 6.74%
Table 4: Consumption volatility.
The second row reports the standard deviation of stockholders’ consumption growth from
the baseline model and from the data (Consumer Expenditure Survey, numbers taken from
Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a) and annualized). The third row reports the same statistics for
nonstockholders’ consumption growth.
Variable Moment Model Data
Cons.Growth (S) Std. Dev. 4.91% 5.80%
Cons.Growth (NS) Std. Dev. 2.32% 3.96%
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Table 5: Asset pricing moments from the data (Campbell (1999)) and from the model with
diﬀerent values of the fixed entry cost (F ).
Variable Moment F = 0.05 F = 0.00 Data
Riskless Rate Mean 1.72% 1.70% 1.58%
Std. Dev. 3.07% 3.04% 5.33%
AR(1) 0.88 0.88 0.52
Equity Return Mean 6.05% 5.98% 8.31%
Std. Dev. 16.31% 16.30% 19.81%
AR(1) −0.05 −0.05 −0.06
Risk Premium Mean 4.33% 4.28% 6.74%
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Table 6: Asset pricing and consumption moments from the data and from diﬀerent versions
of the model, without the fixed cost of participation (F = 0).
The asset pricing data is taken from Campbell (1999) while the consumption data is
from Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a). The results from the model are reported in columns one
through three. Column one (“Two types”) shows the results for the baseline calibration (with
F = 0). Column two (“One type (i)”) refers to the case in which only the type-B agents
exist in the economy, with all other parameter values identical to the ones in the baseline
economy. In column three (“One type (ii)”), we re-calibrate the preference parameters of
the single-agent. More precisely we set ψ = 0.35 and β = 0.97. Rows 1 through 7 report the
same asset pricing moments as in the baseline case. Row 8 reports the standard deviation of
consumption growth. For comparison, in the case of the economy with two types of agents
we show the value for the type−B agents.
Variable Moment Two types One type (i) One type (ii) Data
Riskless Rate Mean 1.70% −2.69% 0.75% 1.58%
Std. Dev. 3.04% 2.31% 2.60% 5.33%
AR(1) 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.52
Equity Return Mean 5.98% 1.33% 4.94% 8.31%
Std. Dev. 16.30% 16.22% 16.28% 19.81%
AR(1) −0.05 −0.04 −0.04 −0.06
Risk Premium Mean 4.28% 4.02% 4.19% 6.74%
Cons.Growth (B) Std. Dev. 5.11% 4.61% 4.46% 5.80%
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Table 7: Asset pricing and aggregate consumption moments from the baseline model and
the model with low aggregate uncertainty (s = 0).
Variable Moment Baseline s = 0
Riskless Rate Mean 1.72% 2.74%
Std. Dev. 3.07% 0.11%
AR(1) 0.88 0.68
Equity Return Mean 6.05% 4.06%
Std. Dev. 16.31% 0.98%
AR(1) −0.05 0.33
Risk Premium Mean 4.33% 1.32%
Cons.Growth (S) Std. Dev. 4.91% 1.75%
Cons. Growth (NS) Std. Dev. 2.32% 0.81%
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Table 8: Asset pricing and consumption moments from the data and from the model with
diﬀerent levels of government debt (debt to GDP ratio, B/Y ).
The asset pricing data is taken from Campbell (1999) while the consumption data is from
Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a). The results from the model are reported in columns one through
three. Column one (“B/Y = 40%”) is our baseline model. Column two (“B/Y = 15% (i)”)
reports the results for the same parameter values as the baseline calibration except that
B/Y is equal to 15%. Column three (“B/Y = 15% (ii)”) also assumes B/Y equal to 15%
but uses parameters values calibrated under this assumption. More precisely, the discount
factor β is now equal to 0.98 (without mortality adjustment).
Variable Moment B/Y=40% B/Y=15% (i) B/Y=15% (ii) Data
Riskless Rate Mean 1.72% −0.04% 1.35% 1.58%
Std. Dev. 3.07% 3.32% 3.00% 5.33%
AR(1) 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.52
Equity Return Mean 6.05% 5.18% 6.77% 8.31%
Std. Dev. 16.31% 16.29% 16.33% 19.81%
AR(1) −0.05 −0.05 −0.05 −0.06
Risk Premium Mean 4.33% 5.60% 5.42% 6.74%
Cons.Growth (S) Std. Dev. 4.91% 5.72% 5.23% 5.80%
Cons. Growth (NS) Std. Dev. 2.32% 2.35% 2.97% 3.96%
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Table 9: Changes in the model implied moments from perturbations in the preference
parameters.
The changes are measured relative to the values obtained in the baseline model (ψB = 0.4,
β = 0.99 and ρB = 5). All other parameter values are those used in the baseline model.
Moment ψB = 0.3 β = 0.98 ρB = 4
Mean Riskless Rate 2.03% 1.63% 1.18%
Std. Dev. Riskless Rate 0.11% −0.22% −0.24%
Mean Equity Return 1.97% 1.57% 0.81%
Mean Risk Premium −0.06% −0.07% −0.37%
Std. Dev. Cons. Growth (Stock.) −1.13% −0.32% −0.25%
Std. Dev. Cons. Growth (Non-Stock.) −0.07% −0.29% −0.05%
Capital-Output Ratio −9.86% −9.14% −4.67%
Stock Market Participation Rate −0.17% −0.34% −0.12%
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Table 10: Changes in the model implied moments from perturbations in the technology
parameters.
The changes are measured relative to the values obtained in the baseline model (σu =
0.01, π = 2/3 and δ = 0.1). All other parameter values are those used in the baseline model.
Moment σu = 0.02 π = 0.8 δ = 0.08
Mean Riskless Rate −0.01% −0.01% 0.22%
Std. Dev. Riskless Rate 0.00% 0.00% 0.43%
Mean Equity Return −0.01% −0.01% 0.76%
Mean Risk Premium 0.00% 0.00% 0.54%
Std. Dev. Cons. Growth (Stock.) −0.01% 0.00% 0.78%
Std. Dev. Cons. Growth (Non-Stock.) 0.02% −0.01% −0.02%
Capital-Output Ratio 0.08% 0.04% 7.87%
Stock Market Participation Rate −0.02% 0.02% 0.23%
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Figure 1 - Life-Cycle Wealth Accumulation, Labor Income and Consumption
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